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In his magnum opus Being and Time, Martin 
Heidegger lays out two unique beings, or entities, and their 
corresponding modalities of being. Heidegger begins with 
two primary classes of entities: Dasein and ‘innerworldly 
beings.’ Within Heidegger’s ontology, ‘innerworldly beings’ 
can be further parsed into two kinds of entities: substances 
and equipment. Substances, or ‘things’, are based upon 
traditional philosophy’s1 notion of substance ontology, in 
which a thing objectively present has qualities that do not 
depend upon its situation. Heidegger calls the mode of being 
of these beings ‘objective presence,’ or present-at-hand 
[Vorhandenheit]. The second being Heidegger formulates is 
equipment [Zeug], which has the mode of being of 
‘handiness,’ or readiness-to-hand [Zuhandenheit]. And 
finally, the third being, Dasein, which (generally) 
corresponds to human entities, has the mode of being of 
existence. Heidegger holds that while the entities of the first 
two types of being do not depend on Dasein, their mode of 
being itself does. In other words, while the equipment itself 
does not depend on Dasein, the readiness-to-hand, or the 
mode of being of the equipment, does. It is important to note 
that while the modalities present-at-hand and readiness-to- 
                                                
1 Heidegger specifically cites Aristotle and Kant as individuals who 
represent the paradigm for traditional philosophy. In Heidegger’s 
opinion, the metaphysics exemplified by the school of traditional 
philosophy relies, at the most basic level, upon a subject/object 
distinction.   
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hand are separate from one another, this is due to the 
dependence of the modalities of being upon Dasein’s 
existence within the world. They apply to the same class of 
entities, namely ‘innerworldly beings,’ as these are 
independent of Dasein. As such, there can arise cases in 
which it is difficult to discern the modality of being 
belonging to some ‘innerworldly beings,’ and this is 
precisely what we will be exploring in this essay.  
In exposing the phenomena of the worldliness of the 
world, Heidegger focuses primarily on the being of 
equipment as ready-to-hand. However, in §15 and 162, 
Heidegger very briefly delves into what he calls a specific 
kind of readiness-to-hand – that is, un-readiness-to-hand 
[Unzuhandenheit]. In this paper, I hope to accomplish two 
goals: first, to expel my own confusion as to the way of 
being of un-readiness-to-hand by analyzing what I take to be 
its structure; second, to put forth the suggestion that un-
readiness-to-hand should be considered as a fourth mode of 
being, although still a way of being of Zeug (equipment), 
which, similar to the mode of being of a substance, is an 
‘innerworldly being.’3 
 
II. Zuhandenheit: Readiness-to-Hand 
In setting the course for this paper, I believe it will 
prove useful to first briefly analyze Heidegger’s structure of 
readiness-to-hand, where upon we can build the way of 
being of un-readiness-to-hand. As opposed to objective 
presence, the being of readiness-to-hand is encountered in  
                                                
2 Entitled, respectively, The Being of the Entities Encountered in the 
Environment, and How the Worldly Character of the Environment 
Announces itself in Entities Within-the-World. 
3 I will call un-readiness-to-hand a ‘way’ of being, and reserve the term 
‘mode’ for the other three, established being of beings. 
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Dasein’s “everyday being-in-the-world, which we also call 
our ‘dealings’ [Umgang] in the world with entities within-
the-world” (66/7).4  This everyday association in the world, 
and Dasein’s dealings with equipment, cannot be 
characterized by some sort of perceptual cognition of the 
qualities of substances objectively present, but rather is “a 
handling, using, and taking care of things” (68). This 
association takes its most primordial form when Dasein 
literally uses the equipment. Heidegger explicates two 
essential, though certainly not independent, aspects of 
equipment in the mode of being ‘ready-to-hand.’ First, 
equipment have in their way of being an ‘in-order-to.’ For 
example, a hammer has the ‘in-order-to’ of hammering. 
Heidegger writes: 
In dealings such as this, where something is 
put to use, our concern subordinated itself to 
the “in-order-to” which is constitutive for the 
equipment we are employing at the time; the 
less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and 
the more we seize hold of it and use it, the 
more primordial does our relationship to it 
become, and the more unveiledly is it 
encountered as that which it is – as 
equipment. (69)  
 
It is important to note the stress that Heidegger 
places on the actual using of the hammer, which brings its 
being to the most primordial and genuine ready-to-hand. In a 
sense, as Heidegger writes, the hammer is restored to its true 
ready-to-hand through its withdrawing as a hammer per se.  
                                                
4 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Print. (I will use 
the German pagination of Being and Time for references.) 
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In other words, when Dasein is absorbed in the world and 
dealing non-cognitively with equipment, the hammer 
withdraws, or becomes transparent as a ‘hammer,’ and 
becomes a primordial equipment ‘in-order-to’ pound nails.5 
The structure of this ‘in-order-to’ brings Heidegger 
to the second essential aspect of the mode of being of 
readiness-to-hand: belonging to the referential totality of 
equipment.6 Put another way, the totality of all equipment 
must be given in advance of any one particular thing, and all 
equipment contains within its being a ‘to hand’ reference to 
the totality of all other equipment. To keep with the example 
of hammering, a ‘hammer’ as an equipment can only make 
sense within the totality of equipment such as nails, wood, 
frames, houses, and so on. Without such reference, a 
hammer would simply be taken as some thing objectively 
present – an object with qualities. For some ‘thing’ to be a 
‘hammer,’ it must have ‘in-order-to(s)’ which reference the 
whole of equipment.  
Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an 
equipment. To the being of any equipment 




                                                
5 Heidegger writes: “The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at 
all, nor is it itself the sort of things that circumspection takes proximally 
as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-
to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in 
order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our 
everyday dealing proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the 
contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work” 
(69). 
6 In order to understand this point, however, we must realize that 
‘reference’ does not mean anything linguistic. 
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in which it can be this equipment that it is. 7 
(68) 
 
These two aspects taken together – the primary ‘in-
order-to’ of equipment and the belonging to a referential 
totality – allows Heidegger to make a further claim 
regarding Dasein’s role within the referential totality. The 
referential whole of ‘in–order-to’ eventually finds its final 
‘in-order-to’ within Dasein’s ‘for-the-sake-of-which,’ in 
which Dasein takes a stand on its being. This final ‘for-the-
sake-of-which’ is the stage where no further involvement 
exists within in the referents. In other words, while the 
equipment of hammer has the primary ‘in-order-to’ of 
pounding nails (which can be drawn out into further ‘in-
order-to(s),’ such as building a wall and building a house), 
this must eventually lead to the final referent for which 
Dasein employs the ‘hammer’ as equipment, which is to say, 
to take a stand on its being.8 For example, in the case of the 
hammer, this may be to take some stand as ‘being a 
carpenter’ or ‘being a shelterer.’ Now, it is important to note 
that this is certainly not a conscious decision on the part of 
Dasein – one does not employ equipment for the explicit 
purpose of taking a reasoned stand on one’s being. Instead, 
this stand comes inseparably alongside the use of equipment,  
 
                                                
7 Again, Heidegger writes: “Equipment – in accordance with its 
equipmentality – always is in terms of its belonging to other equipment” 
(68). 
8 Heidegger writes: “But the ‘for-the-sake-of’ always pertains to the 
being of Dasein, for which, in its being, that very being is essentially an 
issue. We have thus indicated the interconnection by which the structure 
of an involvement leads to Dasein’s very being as the sole authentic ‘for-
the-sake-of-which’” (84).  
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understand its being. 
In sum, we can say that equipment must have more 
that an ‘in-order-to;’ to be what they ‘are’ they must also 
have a referential part in the whole of equipment. Equipment 
is truly and most primordially equipment when it is being 
used, and this is how Dasein relates in its being of existence 
to equipment. At the most absorbed (and basic) level, when 
Dasein is simply dealing with an equipment, it becomes less 
and less noticeable, and functions as withdrawing. We may 
say confidently, then, that ‘an equipment’ ceases to be what 
it is when is becomes isolated and no longer has a reference 
to, or is part of, the whole. And, as equipment can be said to 
exist within the referential totality most primordially when it 
is in use and withdrawing (that is, in the mode of being 
ready-to-hand), we are left to ponder the being of equipment 
when not in use and withdrawing. Therefore, we may ask the 
question: what mode of being does a hammer have when it 
is simply lying there and not withdrawing? 
 
III. Encountering Unzuhandenheit 
 Heidegger begins his discussion of un-ready-to-hand 
by articulating three instances in which Dasein meets the 
beings of equipment as “unusable”: conspicuousness 
[Auffälligkeit], obtrusiveness [Aufdringlichkeit], and 
obstinacy [Aufsässigkeit]. At the point in which Heidegger 
addresses the way of being of un-readiness-to-hand, which 
he believes to be a deficient mode of readiness-to-hand, he 
seems to imply that all ways of encountering equipment as 
un-ready-to-hand must involve some sort of “breakdown.” 
However, much later in Division II of Being and Time, when 
discussing the temporality of circumspection, Heidegger 
states that there are ways of encountering equipment as un-
ready-to-hand which do not involve a breakdown. I will  
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begin by addressing the cases in which a breakdown is 
involved, where upon we can build the cases in which a 
breakdown is not required.  
Heidegger holds that it is when Dasein comes across 
equipment in the way of being un-ready-to-hand that the 
referential whole of the ‘in-order-to(s)’ is revealed. In other 
words, within Dasein’s non-cognitive dealings in the world, 
the equipmental whole exists and is understood, but not 
made intelligible. On the other hand, when this dealing in 
the world is interrupted, Dasein is made to realize the 
necessary determination that the whole has upon the 
particular equipment. For example, it is only when the 
hammer ‘breaks’ that Dasein realizes that there exists an 
explicit equipment used for pounding nails. Until the 
breakdown, the hammer, as equipment withdrawing, is 
simply given as a general equipment ‘in-order-to’ pound 
nails. I believe we can make sense of this with the semantic 
difference of Dasein’s viewing the ‘hammer’ as a ‘nail-
pounder,’ when circumspectively dealing within the world, 
as opposed to an explicit ‘hammer-tool for pounding nails’ 
after the interruption, when the equipment is given in the 
mode of un-ready-to-hand. In Dasein’s encountering the un-
ready-to-hand, Heidegger holds that Dasein is met with an 
equipmental entity that has neither the mode of being of 
readiness-to-hand, nor pure presence-at-hand, as a substance 
would. Instead, he holds that Dasein encounters presence-at-
hand alongside readiness-to-hand. He writes: 
Un-readiness-to-hand…implies that what 
cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as 
an equipmental Thing which looks so and so, 
and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking 
that way, has constantly been present-at-hand 
too. Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in  
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such equipment, but only to withdraw to the 
readiness-to-hand of something with which one 
concerns oneself…This presence-at-hand of 
something that cannot be used is still not 
devoid of all readiness-to-hand whatsoever; 
equipment which is present-at-hand in this way 
is still not just a Thing which occurs 
somewhere. (73) 
   
 Throughout these sections in which Heidegger 
discusses the relationship between readiness-to-hand and 
presence-at-hand, I take him to be positing a bivalent 
relationship. First, to some degree we can see that the being 
of present-at-hand underlies the ready-to-hand. This 
relationship seemingly has the quality of some form of 
‘weak causality.’ In other words, if the present-at-hand, or 
the substance with certain de-situated qualities did not exist, 
neither would the ready-to-hand equipment. This 
relationship comes to the fore as Heidegger discusses the 
necessary ‘suitability’ of equipment. Not all substances can 
be hammers, only those with the substantial qualities of 
medium-length, a hard head, and so on. In another way, 
however, we must view the relationship between the ready-
to-hand and the present-at-hand as one in which the ready-
to-hand must underlie the present-at-hand. This relationship 
seemingly holds the quality of intelligibility. This must be 
the case, as no sort of substantial qualities can make a 
‘hammer-Thing’ a ‘hammer.’ In other words, no matter how 
suitable some set of qualities given to a substance are for the 
making of a hammer, a ‘hammer’ is only one insofar as it 
exists within the referential totality. As such, the present-at-
hand being of substance, such as a hammer, is only 
intelligible through Dasein’s dealing with hammers qua  
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equipment. Therefore, we may conclude that the modes of 
being of present-at-hand and ready-to-hand mutually found 
each other. 
The first, and seemingly most obscene way in which 
un-readiness-to-hand is encountered is through 
obtrusiveness. In this “breakdown,” Dasein finds itself 
within a situation where the necessary equipment cannot be 
found, or is not ‘to hand’ [zur Hand] (73). This occurs when, 
for example, set to the task of pounding nails, Dasein cannot 
find a hammer. This causes all ready-to-hand objects within 
the work-world that are given to become present-at-hand, as 
Dasein cannot deal with anything until a hammer is also 
given. In my opinion, this case of encounter appears the 
most forceful, as everything appears present-at-hand with 
Dasein standing helplessly before the work-world. This 
encounter is obviously a form of a “breakdown” in which 
‘innerworldly beings’ become present-at-hand, for 
seemingly nothing further can be done without the hammer 
being available.  
The second form of encounter comes in the instance 
of a more temporary “breakdown,” obstinacy, where an 
entity as un-ready-to-hand “‘stands in the way’ of our 
concern” (73). This encounter may come in the form of a 
hammer’s head falling off. This form of un-ready-to-hand 
reintroduces a mode of ready-to-hand, as Dasein is set to 
task in repairing the particular equipment in-order-to resume 
other dealings. These two modes of un-ready-to-hand have a 
unique way of being present-at-hand alongside the ready-to-
hand, as both involve equipment de-situated. In other words, 
the qualities of ‘missing’ or ‘broken’ exist across a range of 
situations, and without particular reliance upon a context. A 
‘broken’ hammer has the objective presence of ‘broken-
ness,’ such that although the ‘hammer’ still exists within the  
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equipmental totality, it is also present-at-hand with certain 
qualities. These “breakdown” encounters with the un-ready-
to-hand, in my opinion, follow Heidegger’s outline for the 
introduction of worldliness through the un-ready-to-hand. 
This ‘worldiness’ appears as the totality of equipment 
encountered, and is therefore given explicitly when this 
totality shows itself through un-ready-to-hand equipment 
lending reference to the whole. I want to argue, however, 
that the encounter with the un-ready-to-hand yet to be 
discussed – conspicuousness – lends itself to a reading that 
shows the necessity of considering the un-ready-to-hand as a 
fourth mode of being.  
According to Heidegger, conspicuousness can be 
encountered in numerous ways. In §16, Heidegger primarily 
focuses on the malfunction of equipment, which, for 
example, may concern a hammer being ‘too heavy.’ Much 
later in Being and Time, he states that it may also involve 
something as innocent as “inspecting.” He writes, 
concerning Dasein’s switch from “practical” circumspection 
(ready-to-hand dealing) to “theoretical” investigation, which 
involves the tying of the ready-to-hand to the un-ready-to-
hand by conspicuousness: 
The tarrying which is discontinued when one 
manipulates, can take on the character of a 
more precise kind of circumspection, such as 
‘inspecting’, checking up on what has been 
attained, or looking over the ‘operations’ 
which are now ‘at a standstill’. Holding back 
from use of equipment is so far from sheer 
‘theory’ that the kind of circumspection with 
tarries and ‘considers’, remains wholly in the 
grip of the ready-to-hand equipment with 
which one is concerned. (358) 
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This precise ‘inspecting,’ yet remaining stuck in the 
tools, is encountering the un-ready-to-hand. Heidegger 
places this encounter along the path of moving from pure 
practical dealing to theoretical investigation. In this, we may 
understand the difference between de-situated and de-
worlded. As Dasein encounters equipment as ready-to-hand, 
it does so in a completely situation-based context given 
through the referential totality of equipment. As Dasein 
begins to abstract, the mode of un-ready-to-hand is 
encountered through ‘inspection,’ and in this mode, 
equipment is seen as de-situated, which seems to mean 
having ‘properties,’ though ‘properties’ dependent upon 
context. Therefore, in a sense, the equipment is still quite 
‘situated,’ though, as it is not primordially being ready-to-
hand, it has been taken out of its primary situation of 
withdrawing. Finally, once Dasein is operating on the level 
of ‘theorizing,’ it begins to deal with innerworldly beings 
that are completely free of any referent within the 
equipmental whole. 9 
I take it, based on the quote given above, as well as 
Heidegger’s discussion of breakdown within the encounter 
of un-ready-to-hand, that there are two major ways in which 
equipment can become conspicuous. The first, which 
Heidegger primarily discusses, involves some sort of  
                                                
9 I take an example of this to be the different ways of regarding speed: in 
ready-to-hand dealing, equipment is moving relative to other equipment, 
as some particular equipment moves at the speed it would take to do 
some job. (A jackhammer moves with the necessary speed in-order-to 
break concrete.) Once de-situated, particular equipment has the property 
of moving fast. This fastness must still be relative to something, for 
example, ‘too fast’ for me to operate it, but it is seen apart from its in-
order-to. Finally, when a ‘theoretical’ investigation is taking place, 




“break,” where a hammer is “too heavy” to do some job, and 
therefore work, or absorbed dealing, must stop. However, 
this is not necessarily the case. There is another way in 
which the hammer is recognized as having properties 
relevant for hammering, for example, heavy, but where 
Dasein is not intending the hammer for use at this moment, 
and is instead ‘inspecting’. The un-ready-to-hand thus 
encountered through ‘inspection,’ unlike ready-to-hand, 
does not operate in the mode of Dasein’s dealing with 
equipment withdrawing. Yet, it is also unlike things 
objectively present, as Dasein still remains within tools 
when inspecting them. In other words, when Dasein realizes, 
for example, that the hammer is “heavy,” this heavy-ness 
cannot be taken as a quality for objective presence, for it is 
“heavy” for me, in this situation, relative to this other 
hammer, and so on. The hammer, although “heavy,” still 
remains within the referential totality of equipment, and has 
not been de-worlded as objective presence must be. And yet, 
as the hammer is simply lying there, and is not withdrawing, 
it also is not being as genuine, primordial ready-to-hand. 
Instead, as an “equipment,” it is both somewhat being ready-
to-hand, and somewhat displaying its objective presence 
(74). It has the unique way of a being of un-ready-to-hand, 
or maybe more appropriately, what one could call potential 
ready-to-hand. It is recognized as a hammer, with some 
property relevant for hammering, and therefore relative to 
other equipment in the referential totality, yet has not broken 
down to expose this referential totality, and further has not 
been ‘theoretically’ investigated to the point of becoming 
de-worlded. 
I argue that Heidegger makes a mistake in classifying 
this way of being as a deficient mode of being, subsuming it 
under ready-to-hand. As the hammer is lying there, although  
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it certainly has an ‘in-order-to’ in terms of the referential 
whole, it does not have the explicit ‘in-order-to’ of a 
transparent, withdrawing, equipment. I may, in fact, observe 
it there, though not as an objective presence, but as an un-, 
or maybe more appropriately, non-ready-to-hand. 
 
IV. The Being of Unzuhandenheit 
As Heidegger often recognizes and notes, when 
participating in the study of fundamental ontology, we must 
look to the phenomena first. So, we must ask ourselves, 
what is the phenomenon of the hammer, recognized as a 
hammer, lying there? Modes of being, as that on the basis of 
which [woraufhin] entities are intelligible, must be that 
which in the background is already present, pre-
phenomenologically, in order that we understand the entities 
of this non-equipment. In other words, analogous to the 
requirement of the mode of being of ready-to-hand being 
already understood before Dasein can understand a 
‘hammer,’ so must the non-ready-to-hand be pre-
phenomenologically grasped before one can know a 
particular equipment in such a mode. I contend that when we 
understand a being as lying there, inappropriate, though fully 
functional, for a situation, we understand it in terms of both 
the referential totality, and its non-serviceability. For some-
thing to be equipment qua equipment, Heidegger writes, we 
must understand this “‘serviceability-for’…[which] is an 
ontological, categorical determination” (78). As such, the 
hammer deemed “heavy” is understood as a potentially 
ready-to-hand equipment. Yet, as it has been deemed by 
Dasein not applicable for explicit use, and is instead simply 
being ‘inspected’ relative to other equipment, it is 
understood in its non-usefulness.  By non-useful, and non-
serviceable, I mean neither useful or serviceable, nor not- 
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useful or not-serviceable. Instead, I use the prefix non- to 
connote a recognized irrelevance to current use-value 
outside of ‘inspection’ itself. To put it differently, when I 
understand the being of a hammer lying there, yet have no 
reason to use it, I understand it both in regards to the 
referential totality of equipment, and its potential ready-to-
hand. As I also understand it as not withdrawing or 
transparent, I understand its being as un-ready-to-hand 
equipment. And, based on this phenomenon, I argue that 
through the encounter with an object in its place within the 
referential whole, yet also in its situational non-usefulness, I 
understand it in its genuine, everyday being. Thus, we must 
view this un-ready-to-hand not as a subcategory of ready-to-
hand, but as a fourth mode of being, where equipment may 
have either the being of ready-to-hand or of un-ready-to-
hand. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
